|
Getting your Trinity Audio player ready...
|
Table of Contents of Article
This article lays out an in-depth discussion as to the three big reasons why the FAA’s FAR Part 48 drone registration regulations are illegal and should be struck down by a court.ย The registration regulations are currently being challenged in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by John Taylor and I am assisting him with the lawsuit.
Key Point of the Rule:
โPersons owning small unmanned aircraft, whether intended to be used as model aircraft or as other than model aircraft, are required to register those aircraft with the FAA[.]โ โThis rule applies to all owners of small unmanned aircraft which weigh more than 0.55 pounds and less than 55 pounds on takeoff.โ It goes into effect Dec 21, 2015. If you do not comply, you could face civil penalties up to $27,500 and criminal penalties of $250,000[1] and/or imprisonment up to 3 years.[2]
While the electronic means of registration seems great and would be a wonderful thing for my commercial droneย clients, the issue is NOT with the proposed regulations but (1) the apparent direct violation of Section 336 of the FMRA, (2) the improper use of the โgood causeโ bypass exception to the Administrative Procedures Act, and (3) the lack of statutory authority.
Section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 says:
โIN GENERAL.โNotwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the incorporation of unmanned aircraft systems into Federal Aviation Administration plans and policies, including this subtitle, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft being developed as a model aircraft[.]โ The key word here is โanyโ and the major take away is that it prevents the promulgation of new rules or regulations, not the using of already existing regulations (i.e. Part 47 and ยง 91.203).The FAA believes that model aircraft operators are now subject to 91.203 which requires the drone to be registered prior to operation in the national airspace.
FAA responded to the Section 336 prohibition allegation in the registration rule document:
โThe FAA disagrees with the comments asserting that the registration of model aircraft is prohibited by section 336 of Public Law 112-95. While section 336 bars the FAA from promulgating new rules or regulations that apply only to model aircraft, the prohibition against future rulemaking is not a complete bar on rulemaking and does not exempt model aircraft from complying with existing statutory and regulatory requirements. As previously addressed, Public Law 112-95 identifies model aircraft as aircraft and as such, the existing statutory aircraft registration requirements implemented by part 47 apply.
This action simply provides a burden-relieving alternative that sUAS owners may use for aircraft registration. Model aircraft operated under section 336 as well as other small unmanned aircraft are not required to use the provisions of part 48. Owners of such aircraft have the option to comply with the existing requirements in part 47 that govern aircraft registration or may opt to use the new streamlined, web-based system in part 48.โโ[3]
If this is a โburden-relieving alternative[,]โ why does the rule seeks to amend the non-alternative current rules in Part 1, ยง 45.1, ยง 47.2, ยง 47.3, ยง 47.7, ยง 91.203, ยง 375.11, and ยง 375.38? This rule is a new rule coupled with multiple regulations being amended so as to harmonize the new rule in Part 48.
One key point is that this is being codified in Part 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations which brings us squarely back to the issue of the prohibition on the creation of rules or regulations.
If it is โnot a complete bar on rulemaking[.]โ what is it a bar actually on? It has to be a bar on something and it would be completely ludicrous to interpret it as a bar on nothing. The FAAโs interpretation is that it is a bar on โsomeโ rulemaking, just not โany.โ The scope of โsomeโ is completely unclear.
Context is king. โStatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme โ because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.โ[4] We must not seek the FAAโs interpretation of this statute, but Congressโ meaning of the FMRA.
Letโs look at the word โanyโ used elsewhere in Sections 331-336 of the FMRA and replace โanyโ with the FAAโs interpretation of โsomeโ and see what happens.
โ[E]nsure that any [some] civil unmanned aircraft system includes a sense and avoid capability[,]โ[5]
โ[I]ncorporation of the plan into the annual NextGen Implementation Plan document (or any [some] successor document) of the Federal Aviation Administration.โ[6]
โIN GENERAL.โNotwithstanding any [some] other requirement of this subtitle, and not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall determine if certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace system before completion of the plan and rulemaking required by section 332 of this Act or the guidance required by section 334 of this Act.โ[7]
โ[W]hich types of unmanned aircraft systems, if any [some], as a result of their size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, and operation within visual line of sight do not create a hazard to users of the national airspace system or the public or pose a threat to national security[,]โ[8]
โ[O]utside of 5 statute miles from any [some] airport, heliport, seaplane base, spaceport, or other location with aviation activities.โ[9]
โIN GENERAL.โNotwithstanding any [some] other provision of law relating to the incorporation of unmanned aircraft systems into Federal Aviation Administration plans and policies, including this subtitle, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not promulgate any [some] rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft being developed as a model aircraft,โ[10]
โ[T]he aircraft is operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any [some] manned aircraft[.]โ[11]
Using the redefined โanyโ causes havoc on the reading of the text. The context of all those sections using โanyโ used it just as if they would have used the word โall.โ
Though not as contextually persuasive as Sections 331-336, 14 CFR ยง 1.3 Rules of Construction differs from the FAAโs interpretation, โโa person may not * * *โ mean[s] that no person is required, authorized, or permitted to do the act prescribed[.]โโ Why did I bring up ยง 1.3? Because that rule of construction applies to 91.203 which is going to be the regulation cited against individuals flying their drones unregistered, โno person may operate a civil aircraft unless it has within it the following: The FAAโs interpretation of Section 336 โmay not promulgate any[,]โ meaning some rules or regulations, is different than their interpretation of 91.203 โno person may[,]โ meaning all persons, which is currently being used against one individual, Skypan, and will be used against any future individuals who choose to not register their drone prior to operation.
The Second Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has said:
As the Supreme Court has frequently observed, use of the word “any” in statutory text generally indicates Congress’s intent to sweep broadly to reach all varieties of the item referenced. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976) in concluding that, โ[r]ead naturally, the word `any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind'”); accord HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002) (same); Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that “Congress made [the phrase at issue] even broader when it chose the expansive word `any’ to precede the list” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court most recently applied this principle in interpreting the phrase “`any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air'” in the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1460, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. ยง 7602(g)) (ellipsis and emphases in original). It concluded that “[o]n its face,” the quoted language “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word `any.‘[12]
The United States Supreme Court has said:
โ[A]nyโ can and does mean different things depending upon the setting. Compare, e. g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (suggesting an expansive meaning of the term “`any other term of imprisonment'” to include state as well as federal sentences), with Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 542-546 (2002) (implying a narrow interpretation of the phrase โany claim assertedโ so as to exclude certain claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds). To get at Congress’s understanding, what is needed is a broader frame of reference, and in this litigation it helps if we ask how Congress could have envisioned the . . . clause actually working. . . . See, e. g., New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals of N. J., 338 U. S. 665, 673 (1950) (enquiring into โthe practical operation and effectโ of a state tax on federal bonds).[13]
Contexts indicates that Congress practically intended that model aircraft would be free from the creation of rules or regulations. This is evidenced by sub-section (b) which says, โSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.โNothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to pursue enforcement action against persons operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.โ[14] The only thing in all of Section 336 that could even be read to limit the FAA is the language โmay not promulgate[.]โ
Buttressing that, sub-section (c) defines โmodel aircraftโ more narrowly than the definition of unmanned aircraft in Section 331 which indicates that it is a โspecialโ sub-classification of the broad classification of unmanned aircraft. This all points to Congress intending to mean any any time it is used in Section 331-336.
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court, while acknowledging that any could mean different things, it is generally to be taken as a broad sweep of the category, unless context indicates otherwise. Furthermore, context indicates that sub-section (b) and (c) both look at (a) as providing something special that unmanned aircraft (non-model and public aircraft) do not get.
5 U.S.C. ยง 553 says,
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall includeโ
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not applyโ
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
14 CFR ยง 11.11 echoes,
A final rule with request for comment is a rule that the FAA issues in final (with an effective date) that invites public comment on the rule. We usually do this when we have not first issued a [proposed rule] . . . , because we have found that doing so would be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. We give our reasons for our determination in the preamble. The comment period often ends after the effective date of the rule. A final rule not preceded by an [proposed rule] is commonly called an โimmediately adopted final rule.โ
So unless the proposed regulation falls into the good cause bypass exception, it has to go through the rule making process required by Congress. It is ubiquitously called โnotice and comment.โ To make it simple, unless bypassed, the FAA must publish the proposed rule in the Federal Register, the public is given an opportunity to comment on it, the FAA must digests the comments and then publish a final rule. There are many steps involved that are beyond the scope of this article, but if you want more info, I wrote a chapter on the FAA rule making process for the American Bar Association book located here.
The greenย arrow is where Part 48 was with the registration task forceโs proposal on November 21, 2015.ย The blue arrow is where the current Part 107 commercial rule is located that was started back in 2009 and was only just published as a proposed rule in February of 2015 and became a final rule in August 29, 2016. The red arrow is ย where the current registration rule,ย Part 48, is located in the rule making process. ย The point I’m making is it bypassed all that stuff in the middle.

The FAA can only do this if it can show that going the notice and comment route is either โimpracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.โ
The FAA acknowledges the comments of individuals saying this violates the APA in pages 156-159 and points us back to the preamble (page 11) of the document.
The FAAโs justifications for the good cause exception were not completely clear on which of the three justifications categories they fall into so I attempted to categorize them from pages 11-20. I was unclear as to where most of the โimpracticableโ justifications should go and made a good faith effort to represent the FAAโs position accurately because Iโm assuming they didnโt throw in non-exception factual justifications.
We are going to look at case law where applicable that will explain the good cause exception from 5 U.S.C. 553 and we will also look to the Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 11, which โapplies to the issuance, amendment, and repeal of any regulation for which FAA (โweโ) follows public rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (โAPAโ) (5 U.S.C. 553).โ[30]
This is an excerpt from my American Bar Association book chapter on FAA rule making which deals specifically with these areas. Keep in mind Iโm not going through the footnotes and trying to correct all the supraโs.
Airworthiness Directives are subject to the rulemaking process as described elsewhere in this chapter. The FAA has an Airworthiness Directives Manual[31] which explains these three good cause exceptions that will now be discussed.
ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย ย โThis exception can be used when an urgent and unsafe condition exists that must be addressed quickly, and there is not enough time to carry out Notice and Comment procedures without compromising safety.โ[32] The manual goes on to say the urgency must be explained and the time to give individuals to comply with the AD must reflect the urgency.[33] “For example, it would make little sense to say immediate action is necessary to prevent a landing gear failure and then allow 60 days compliance time to resolve the unsafe condition.[34] Also, the AD should be issued quickly to be consistent with the determination of โimpracticability.โโ[35] In Air Transport Association of America vs. the Department of Transportation,[36] the FAAโs penalty enforcement action was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court because:
[T]he FAA is foreclosed from relying on the good cause exception[, from the APA,] by its own delay in promulgating the Penalty Rules. The agency waited almost nine months before taking action to implement its authority under section 1475. At oral argument, counsel for the FAA conceded that the delay was largely a product of the agency’s decision to attend to other obligations. We are hardly in a position to second guess the FAA’s choices in determining institutional priorities. But insofar as the FAA’s own failure to act materially contributed to its perceived deadline pressure, the agency cannot now invoke the need for expeditious action as “good cause” to avoid the obligations of section 553(b).[37]
ย This type of direct final rule is in effect a โfinal rule with request for comments. [The FAAโs] reason for issuing [this type of] direct final rule without an NPRM is that [the FAA] would not expect to receive any adverse comments, and so an NPRM is unnecessary.โ[38] The FAA plans โthe comment period to end before the effective dateโ so if there are any adverse comments, it can withdraw the final rule and issue an NPRM.[39] If the FAA publishes a rule, but a legitimate adverse comment comes up, the FAA will publish in the Federal Register a notification of withdrawal, part or whole, of the previous direct final rule.[40]ย The FAA can then either publish a new direct final rule with the comments taken into account or publish a NPRM.[41]
Other unnecessary situation are when: (1) no one in the U.S. would be affected by the regulation and (2) the FAA makes โminor corrections, clarifications, and editorial changes.โ[42]
Generally, this exception is coupled with either the impracticable or unnecessary exception. This exceptionโs purpose โis to excuse an agency from the Notice requirement if providing advance Notice would defeat the purpose of the agency action. For example, issuing advance Notice that the government is contemplating financial controls could cause public reactions so excessive that the financial system could be placed in jeopardy.โ[43]
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for DC said,
Generally, the “good cause” exception to notice and comment rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. ยง 553(b)(3)(B), is to be “narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.” Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1980)). The exception excuses notice and comment in emergency situations, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C.Cir.1981), or where delay could result in serious harm. See Hawaii Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir.1995).[44]
Simply put, impracticable means you have no time (emergency), unnecessary means uncontested, and contrary to public interest is where the public would be harmed rather than benefited by the publication of the rule.
In light of the above, I will address the factual justifications for the bypass point by point.
The DC Circuit Court of Appeals examined this bypass carefully a 2014 case.
Impracticability is an “inevitably fact-or-context dependent” inquiry. See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C.Cir.1987). In the past, we have approved an agency’s decision to bypass notice and comment where delay would imminently threaten life or physical property. See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C.Cir.2004) (upholding assertion of good cause when rule was “necessary to prevent a possible imminent hazard to aircraft, persons, and property within the United States”); Council of the S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting the case was one of “life-saving importance” involving miners in a mine explosion); see also Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1179 (observing the good-cause exception should be invoked only in “emergency situations … or where delay could result in serious harm” (emphasis added)).[45]
This is a major point. If you study out all the statutes where the U.S. Congress delegated authority to the FAA to registered aircraft, you’ll notice they are only give power to register – aircraft. They were never given power toย register people anywhere. The statutes always say register and aircraft. Let this sink in. This is a “Do not go pass go” situation. Before we even get to the discussion of 336 and the APA’s good cause exception the FAA needs to answer this.
You don’t even have to own an aircraft to register. The FAA’s own Markeย Gibson said he didn’t even own an aircraft but registered.ย [63]
My fear is this rule will โdelegitimizeโ the FAA and DOT in the eyes of many drone flyers.
Why?
Hope this helps guys. Fly safe. J
[1] 18 U.S.C. 3571
[2] 49 U.S.C. 46306
[3] Page 155.
[4] United Savings Assโn v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
(citations omitted).
[5] Section 332(a)(2)(A)(ii).
[6] Section 332(a)(2)(I).
[7] Section 333(a).
[8] Section 333(b)(1).
[9] Section 334(c)(2)(C)(v).
[10] Section 336(a).
[11] Section 336(a)(4).
[12] Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F. 3d 111, 117-18 ย (2nd Cir. 2007).
[13] Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 US 125, 132-33 (2004).
[14] Section 336(b).
[15] Page 19.
[16] Page 18.
[17] Page 18.
[18] Page 18.
[19] Page 19.
[20] Page 11.
[21] Pages 11-12.
[22] Page 20.
[23] Page 12.
[24] Page 12.
[25] Pages 12-13.
[26] Pages 13-14.
[27] Page 14-16.
[28] Page 17.
[29] Page 17.
[30] 14 C.F.R. 1.1.
[31] Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA-IR-M-8040.1C, Airworthiness Directives Manual (2010) [hereinafter โAD Manualโ], available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgOrders.nsf/0/66ddd8e1d2e95db3862577270062aabd/$FILE/FAA-IR-M-8040_1C.pdf
[32] Id. at 15.
[33] See id.
[34] See
[35] Id.
[36] Air Transp. Assโn of Am. v. Depโt of Transp., 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated without opinion and
remanded, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991), vacated as moot, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[37] Id. at 379.
[38] 14 C.F.R. ยง 11.13.
[39] Id.
[40] See 14 C.F.R. ยง 11.31(c).
[41] See id.
[42] AD Manual, supra note 302, at 15.
[43] AD Manual, supra note 302, at 15.
[44] Jifry v. FAA, 370 F. 3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
[45] Sorenson Communications Inc. v. FCC, 755 F. 3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
[46] Page 19.
[47] Air Transp. Assโn of Am. v. Depโt of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated without opinion and
remanded, 498 U.S. 1023 (1991), vacated as moot, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[48] Page 18.
[49] Page 18.
[50] Page 18.
[51] Page 19.
[52] Page 11.
[53] Pages 11-12.
[54] Page 20.
[55] Page 12.
[56] Page 12.
[57] Pages 12-13.
[58] Page 14-16.
[59] Pages 13-14.
[60] Jifry v. FAA, 370 F. 3d 1174, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
[61] Page 17.
[62] Page 17.
[63]ย At 27:47ย https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOeoHJZdwuw
Aviation Attorney. FAA Certificated Commercial Pilot and Flight Instructor (CFI/CFII). Contributor at Forbes.com for Aerospace and Defense.